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Japanese public pension benefits, which were distributed quarterly through February 1990 and every
other month since then, induce substantial but predictable income fluctuations. The relative magnitude
of the payments combined with the delay between payments yields a stronger test of the Life-Cycle/Permanent
Income Hypothesis than in prior studies. Applying two identification strategies to monthly household
panel data, we find that consumption significantly responds to quarterly benefit receipt. Additional

















The Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LCPIH) is the primary lens through which economists
view the impact of household spending decisions and government policies on the largest component
of GDP, household consumption. The importance of the LCPIH is re°ected in the longstanding tra-
dition of testing empirical implications of the model, e.g., see the surveys of Browning and Lusardi
(1996) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010). A central prediction of the LCPIH is that consump-
tion changes should not be correlated with predictable changes in income. One approach used to
test this implication is to identify anticipated permanent (Shea 1995; Stephens 2008) or transitory
(Souleles 1999; Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006) changes in income. Contrary to the theory,
these papers ¯nd that consumption systematically responds to anticipated income changes.1
The bulk of the tests of LCPIH in this vein, however, do not examine changes in the amounts of
annual salary income or government transfers. Rather, these empirical analyses focus on whether
the timing of income receipt a®ects the timing of consumption, holding annual income constant.
Browning and Collado (2001) ¯nd that Spanish \bonus" workers, who receive payments from their
employers in June and December that equal their usual monthly income, have similar quarterly
consumption patterns as \non-bonus" workers who are paid a constant monthly income stream.
Hsieh (2003) ¯nds that Alaskan households smooth quarterly consumption in response to the state's
annual oil revenue dividend payment which averages two-thirds of monthly pre-tax household in-
come. Paxson (1993) ¯nds no di®erence in monthly consumption patterns across Thai households
with strikingly di®erent seasonal income variation.
Not all tests of the LCPIH which examine the timing of income receipt yield evidence consistent
with consumption smoothing behavior. Parker (1999) ¯nds an increase in consumption among
U.S. households upon reaching their annual maximum Social Security limit for tax contributions.
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) ¯nd that households expected to change their monthly spending in
response to the 1992 reform in the U.S. income tax-withholding law that simply re-allocated the
timing, but not the amount, of after-tax income receipt. At higher frequencies, Stephens (2003,
1A related literature ¯nds consumption changes associated with changes in income at retirement (e.g., Bernheim,
Skinner, Weinberg 2001; Haider and Stephens 2007) although the contemporaneous labor supply changes complicate
the interpretation of these responses as violations of the LCPIH (Aguiar and Hurst 2005).
12006) ¯nds a signi¯cant increase in weekly strictly nondurable consumption in response to monthly
U.S. Social Security check receipt and UK employer paycheck receipt. Using an alternative measure
of consumption, Shapiro (2005) ¯nds that caloric intake falls by 0.3 to 0.4 percent per day between
the monthly receipt of U.S. food stamps while Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) ¯nd a 25 percent
drop in weekly caloric intake between Social Security checks among those bene¯t recipients with
low levels of savings.
In this paper we use the disbursement patterns of Japanese public pension bene¯ts to test the
relationship between the timing of income payments and household consumption. Until February
1990, Japanese public pension bene¯ts were paid every third month. These payments comprise
more than 90 percent of total income for the majority of retired households. Thus, a large number
of these households are only receiving income once every three months which contrasts with the
aforementioned studies of seasonal income variation in which households receive a certain payment
once or twice a year in addition to a regular monthly income. We test whether households are able
to smooth consumption between quarterly public pension bene¯t payments. Given the relatively
long intervals (three months) between which little or no income is received, our analysis of Japanese
public pension recipients during this period presents a rather strong test of household consumption
smoothing between predictable but regular income receipt.
This test overcomes concerns about the interpretation of ¯ndings from prior studies which reject
the LCPIH. Some predictable income changes previously examined in the literature are received
infrequently, are associated with uncertainty in the amounts that the household will receive, and/or
are small relative to annual household income. If households are boundedly rational, in the sense
that any deviations of consumption from optimal decisions are relative small, then predictable
income changes associated with any one of these three features (infrequent, uncertain, or small)
will have relatively small welfare e®ects (Cochrane 1989; Parker 1999; Browning and Crossley
2003). Since the amounts and distribution dates of the quarterly Japanese public pension bene¯ts
are known well in advance of their disbursement and each of these payments represents roughly
one-quarter of annual income, these concerns do not a®ect the interpretation of our analysis.
Since public pension bene¯ts are paid to all households in the same calendar months, we cannot
2separately identify the impact of bene¯t receipt from consumption preferences that vary by season
if we only examine public pension recipients that are paid on the same quarterly cycle. Therefore,
we rely on two complementary identi¯cation strategies to estimate the impact of bene¯t receipt
on household consumption. Our ¯rst identi¯cation strategy relies on a subsequent change in the
disbursement policy of public pension bene¯ts. Beginning in March 1990, the distribution of pub-
lic pension bene¯ts changed from quarterly to being disbursed every other month. This policy
change, which had been announced more than a year earlier, left the total annual public pension
income received by households unchanged while increasing the number of bene¯t payments per year
from four to six.2 Under the assumption that any seasonal consumption preferences unrelated to
check receipt (e.g., December holiday spending) do not change when the check disbursement policy
changes, we can identify the impact of check receipt on consumption by comparing public pension
recipients before and after the policy change.
A possible concern with the above empirical methodology is that our identifying assumption
may be a®ected by the onset of Japan's \Lost Decade" which began in 1990 with a decline in
land and stock prices. Although the retired households that we examine primarily receive a ¯xed
income stream that is largely una®ected by the current state of the economy, it is possible that the
changes in the general economic conditions coincidentally a®ected seasonal consumption patterns.
Therefore, we employ a second identi¯cation strategy which is to compare public pension recipient
households to households headed by employees ages 50 to 59 during the pre-policy reform period.
This alternative comparison avoids the issues arising from using households from di®erent time
periods although we must assume that seasonal consumption preferences are the same for both
public pension recipient and employee headed households.
We use the Japanese Family Income and Expenditure Survey (JFIES), which collects con-
sumption and income information from households over a six-month survey period, to analyze the
2A January 5, 1989 article on page 5 of Nihon-Keizai Shin-bun, the most in°uential newspaper in Japan, stated
\The Ministry of Welfare and Health has agreed to bi-monthly payment of public pension bene¯ts.
Until now, [these bene¯ts] are paid every three months. While most recipients are eager for monthly
payments just like salary since that makes the planning of spending easier, the ministry insisted that
monthly payments would be di±cult due to their processing ability. However, they have compromised
on a bi-monthly payment policy..." (translation by the authors)
3impact of quarterly public pension bene¯t receipt on monthly household consumption. For both of
our identi¯cation strategies, we reject the LCPIH when payments are received quarterly since we
¯nd that household consumption is responsive to public pension bene¯t receipt during this period.
Our point estimates for the increase in non-durable consumption range from four to eight percent
across our two identi¯cation strategies. We ¯nd that consumption remains signi¯cantly higher in
the month after check receipt and that these patterns exist across all of the consumption categories
that we examine. These results contrast with the prior literature which ¯nds no e®ect of large,
seasonal income variation on household consumption (Paxson 1993; Browning and Collado 2001;
Hsieh 2003). One possible explanation for the di®erent ¯ndings in Japan is that, while these prior
studies examine \large" predictable income changes, the consumption °uctuations we examine here
are associated both with much larger payments (as a share of annual income) and with longer gaps
between receipt of any type of income.
We also examine whether variants of the LCPIH can provide plausible explanations for the
consumption response to quarterly bene¯t receipt. Liquidity constraints and precautionary savings
motives, which have been found to be important in other contexts, are unlikely causes of our ¯ndings
since we examine retired Japanese households with a constant and certain income stream. We ¯nd
that our sample households hold fairly high levels of liquid assets, a ¯nding which is inconsistent with
explanations based either on a high rate of time preference or on liquidity constraints. However, the
rather long interval between income payments increases the likelihood that credit market constraints
might be binding relative to prior studies in which regular income is received more frequently. We
¯nd similar consumption responses to check receipt for both high and low income households which
yields further evidence against an important role for liquidity constraints.
The paper is set out as follows. We next provide details on the Japanese retirement bene¯t
system including the eligibility for and the timing of bene¯t payments. We then discuss the JFIES
data and present initial results which demonstrate the magnitude of the predictable income patterns
across households generated by public pension bene¯ts and the resulting monthly consumption
°uctuations. The theoretical and empirical frameworks for our analysis are then presented and are
followed by our econometric ¯ndings. We conclude by discussing both how our results compare
4with prior tests of the LCPIH using seasonal income changes and implications of our ¯ndings for
future research.
2 The Japanese Retirement Bene¯t System
The Japanese public pension bene¯t system involves a variety of pension plans that are both publicly
and privately managed.3 The public pension system is comprised of two tiers: the national pension
and the employee pension. Whether or not an individual receives both of these public pensions
depends upon their sector of employment. The private pension system for employees consists of both
¯rm-speci¯c pensions and, in more recent years, personal pension plans. The ¯rm-speci¯c bene¯ts
are typically distributed as a lump sum at retirement.4 There are also personal pension plans that
are speci¯cally available for self-employed workers who choose to make voluntary contributions to
such a pension as well as personal savings plans that are available to the entire population.
The national pension (sometimes referred to as the basic pension) is a bene¯t available to those
who are employed by either a private ¯rm or a government (local or central) as well as the self-
employed. The bene¯t amount received by each participant in the national pension depends only
on the number of years the participant made contributions. Earnings levels are not factored into
national pension bene¯t payments.5 In addition, since 1985, dependent, non-working spouses are
bene¯ciaries of the national pension.6
The employee pension is actually a system of multiple pension plans. One plan, the Employee's
Pension Insurance, covers private sector workers. There is a separate plan for central government
workers as well as one that covers local government employees. Dependent spouses are also covered
by employee pensions. Self-employed workers, certain agricultural workers, and employees in small
businesses are not eligible for the employee pension.7 Bene¯t levels in the employee pension depend
3Much of discussion in this section is based on Casey (2004).
4Employers at large ¯rms (over 500 employees) are able to o®er ¯rm speci¯c pension bene¯ts which can replace
part of the employee pension payments. Any amount of the ¯rm speci¯c pension that exceeds the employee pension
can be either paid out as an annuity or can be taken as a lump sum. Recent legislative changes have created corporate
de¯ned bene¯t and de¯ned pension plans which will eventually replace these ¯rm-speci¯c pensions.
5In 2007, the annual national pension bene¯t is 792,100 yen.
6Prior to 1985, these spouses could voluntarily enroll in the national pension.
7Also, part-time employees as well as workers on temporary contracts are ineligible for the employee pension.
5upon the individual's earnings while they were working.
The age of eligibility currently di®ers between the national pension and the employee pension.
Before 2001, male public pension recipients were eligible to receive the national pension at age 65
while they could receive the employee pension at age 60.8 In addition, men who were eligible to
receive the employee pension could also receive a \bridge" national pension amount between ages
60 and 64 which equalled the full national pension amount that they would receive beginning at
age 65.9
Until February 1990, public pension bene¯ts were paid once every three months in February,
May, August, and November.10 The national pension and the employee pension both were paid on
the eleventh of the bene¯t month. Public pension payments were subject to an age-related earnings
test. The rules governing the earnings test di®ered somewhat between those ages 60-64 and those
ages 65-69. No such test was imposed on workers ages 70 and above until April 2007. By law,
public pension bene¯ts during this period were automatically increased if in°ation exceeded ¯ve
percent. In practice, the government passed special laws each year to increase bene¯ts at the rate
of in°ation if it did not meet this threshold.
Beginning with the bene¯ts delivered after February 1990, public pension payments have been
made on a bi-monthly basis (February, April, etc.). The annual bene¯t amount did not change
which led to a reduction in the amount of each bene¯t check corresponding to their increased
frequency of disbursement. The delivery date for national and employees pensions changed slightly,
moving from the eleventh of the month to the ¯fteenth.11 Moreover, the earnings test did not
change at the time of the reform although it subsequently has been altered. In addition, automatic
cost of living adjustments to bene¯t levels began in 1990.12
8The age of eligibility currently di®ers for men and women in Japan. Since our analysis will focus on male headed
households, the discussion of bene¯t ages is limited to male bene¯t eligibility.
9Due to a reform announced in 1994, the eligibility age for the employee pension increased by one year every three
years beginning in 2001 so that by 2013 men will have to be age 65 to receive their full employee pension. However,
this reform also introduced a form of early retirement whereby men can begin receiving a reduced employee pension
as early as age 60. In addition, the bridge national pension prior cannot be received prior to one's employee pension
eligibility age.
10There were some exceptions to this disbursement pattern which we discuss in the next section.
11If the regularly scheduled bene¯t delivery date falls on a Sunday or Holiday, it was moved to next weekday before
1992, while it moves one or more days earlier after 1992.
12Between 1986 and 1994, the period we examine below, the annual Japanese in°ation based on the CPI never
exceeded 3.3 percent. Moreover, it fell below one percent in four years and was at or below two percent in seven of
63 Data
3.1 The Japanese Family Income and Expenditure Survey
The data we use are from the Japanese Family Income and Expenditure Survey (JFIES). The
survey excludes agricultural workers and households of single individuals. The JFIES is a panel
survey in which households participate every day for six consecutive calendar months. The panel
is rotating meaning that in any given month approximately one-sixth of households are included
for the ¯rst time, one-sixth are in their second month of participation, etc. The roughly 8,000
households that are interviewed in each month are expected to record all expenditure and income
receipt every day of the month in a diary. These diaries are then collected twice a month during
each of the six months that the households are a part of the survey. However, the microdata that
have been made available for research purposes only identify the month in which each expenditure
and income item is recorded in a diary. In addition, retrospective income is collected for the year
preceding the ¯rst interview. Monthly household demographic and labor force information is also
collected in the JFIES.
In order to examine the impact of the public pension payment frequency change, we use JFIES
data from March 1986 through February 1994. Two factors in°uence the March 1986 starting date
for our analysis. First, the JFIES did not record daily income data for non-working heads before
October 1985 which means public pension receipt cannot be determined among such households
prior to this date. Second, since the timing of the quarterly bene¯t payments changed in February
1986 from March, June, September, December to February, May, August, November, we begin after
this initial switch in the bene¯t distribution date. Our sample period ends in February 1994 in
order to use a symmetric temporal window around the March 1990 change in payment frequency.
For our ¯rst identi¯cation strategy which compares public pension recipients before and after
the policy change, we impose some sample restrictions due to the public pension eligibility rules
and the sampling scheme of the JFIES. First, we only use male-headed households where the male
head is at least 65 years old since national pension bene¯t receipt begins at this age, regardless
these ten years. Information on the Japanese price index is available from the Japanese Statistics Bureau web page
(http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm).
7of work status, for everyone who is eligible for these bene¯ts. Second, we limit this sample to
household heads that are not employed. This restriction raises the importance of public pension
bene¯ts as a source of income while eliminating the impact of other seasonal income °uctuations
(such as annual bonus income) on our estimates. In addition, it circumvents the possibility that
consumption changes are driven by contemporaneous labor force decisions since, as noted above,
one is allowed to work while receiving public pension bene¯ts.13 Third, we restrict this sample
to households that appear in the JFIES for all six months of the survey. Sample attrition in the
JFIES is limited with over 90% of households completing all six JFIES interviews.
We limit the public pension recipient sample to \nuclear families" which we de¯ne as two person
households with a husband and wife. By limiting this sample to nuclear families, we increase the
importance of public pension income as the source of household income since we have eliminated the
earnings of adult children as a potential source of income. While intergenerational households in
which adult children reside with their parents are relatively more common in Japan than in the U.S.,
Casey (2004) notes that between 7 and 10 percent of couples ages 65 and up live in intergenerational
households in Japan while the comparable ¯gure is 1 percent in the United States.14 Therefore, since
the JFIES does not sample single person households and very few elderly couples have children under
age 18, only fourteen percent of elderly couples are excluded by dropping those in intergenerational
households.
Our second identi¯cation strategy compares public pension recipients before the policy change
to \employee" households during the same time period where the latter households are headed by
a male employee between the ages of 50 and 59, inclusive. We use households in this age range
since we want to use comparison households that are not eligible for public pension bene¯ts but
for whom our assumption that the seasonal consumption preferences are the same as those of
public pension recipients will hold. We exclude the self-employed since the JFIES does not collect
monthly income information for these households. As with public pension recipient households,
13Focusing on the non-employed only eliminates eleven percent of the sample after imposing the other restrictions
listed in this section.
14The co-residency ¯gures are much greater for single elderly individuals in Japan with 10 percent of single people
ages 65-74 and 35 percent of those ages 75 and above live in intergenerational households. The comparable numbers
for the U.S. are 5 and 9 percent, respectively (Casey 2004).
8our sample of employee households is limited to married male headed households with exactly two
family members.
The summary statistics for the monthly variables, after imposing the above sample restrictions,
are shown in Panel A of Table 1 under the heading of \Full Sample."15 All income and consumption
measures reported in the paper are in°ated to the year 2000 Yen using the Japanese Consumer
Price Index. The Table indicates that, on average, over 80 percent of income for public pension
recipients is due to these bene¯ts. It is important to note that the JFIES does not allow us to
separate public pension income from other transfer income prior to 1995. However, tabulations
using JFIES data from 1995-2005 for comparable households show that over 99 percent of their
government transfer income is due to public pension bene¯ts. Thus, we refer to income found in
the government transfers category as public pension income for our sample throughout the paper.
We also observe that public pension recipient households receive no income in nearly one-third
the monthly observations. Our sample of employee households has much higher levels of income
and consumption than the public pension recipients. Table 1 also shows that all households have
positive consumption in every month for the four consumption categories that we discuss in more
detail below.
3.2 Public Pension Income in the JFIES
Given the importance of public pension income in our analysis, we examine this measure in the
JFIES to con¯rm that the reported monthly patterns of public pension bene¯ts match the govern-
ment's disbursement patterns before and after the change. In addition, we examine the importance
of public pension payments as an income source for the public pension recipient households in our
sample to highlight the extent to which these bene¯ts are the primary, and many times only, source
of income for recipient households. We also document the pattern of income receipt among our
sample of employee households.
Figure 1 examines public pension income by calendar month before the pay frequency change
for public pension recipient households. Panel A of the Figure presents the share of sample house-
15We discuss the wealth measures, total net ¯nancial assets and normal deposits, in Section 6.
9holds reporting the receipt of public pension income and the share reporting any income at all.
Eighty percent of households report receiving some form of income in the months when public
pension income is distributed while 60 percent do so during the remaining months. Similarly, over
60 percent of households report receiving public pension income during the months it is distributed
while roughly 20 percent of households report receiving these bene¯ts in non-public pension months.
Although this last ¯gure may suggest a large degree of measurement error in reporting, some house-
holds could, in fact, receive public pension income payments outside of the main check disbursement
months during this period. First, as part of the National Public Pension Law which became e®ec-
tive in 1959, a special means tested bene¯t is available once someone who failed to meet the full
contribution requirement of 25 years reaches age 70 if they were born before 1912. This Old-age
Welfare Pension System bene¯t has been distributed in April, August, and December since 1959.
Second, public pension bene¯ts, for those who only received the national pension (i.e., those who
were self-employed when they were working) and who began receiving their bene¯ts prior to April
1986, were distributed quarterly in March, June, September, and December prior to February 1988
at which point they switched to a bi-monthly disbursement system.16 Thus, the patterns shown in
Panel A of Figure 1 are consistent with the government's public pension disbursement policy. We
take steps discussed below to account for these di®ering patterns across households prior to 1990.
The remaining panels in Figure 1 highlight the importance of public pension bene¯ts as the
primary, and in many cases only, source of income among these households. Panel B presents the
pattern of average total and public pension income by calendar month prior to March 1990. Even
though this Panel includes the small set of households that receive public pension income outside
of the quarterly disbursement pattern, the dramatic spikes in total household income during the
bene¯t payment months can be clearly seen. Panel C shows that the share of total income due to
public pension bene¯ts over the entire six month sample period exceeds 90 percent for the majority
of these households. Finally, as a further check on the reporting of public pension bene¯ts in the
JFIES, Panel D shows that the modal household during this period reports receiving public pension
16Those only eligible to receive the national pension and began doing so after April 1986 received their checks in
the same months as those who received both the national and employees pension both before and after the payment
frequency change that we examine here.
10bene¯ts for exactly two months. Over ¯fteen percent of households report receiving public pension
bene¯ts for three months which is consistent with the aforementioned alternative bi-monthly pattern
of public pension receipt for a subset of households before the pay frequency reform.
Figure 2 shows that, after the payment frequency change, the reported patterns of public
pension receipt in the JFIES change accordingly. Panel A shows that over 75 percent of the sample
households report receiving public pension bene¯ts during these assigned bene¯t months while
roughly 10 percent do so in the non-bene¯t receipt months. As Panel B indicates, households still
report substantial °uctuations in average total monthly income following the payment frequency
change although during di®erent months than before the change. Public pension income remains
the primary source of income following the change (Panel C), with over two-thirds of households
reporting more than 90 percent of their income from public pensions. Finally, as shown in Panel D,
over 60 percent of households report receiving exactly three public pension payments during their
six month sample period.
Finally, Figure 3 compares the patterns of income receipt prior to the disbursement policy for our
sample of households headed by employees ages 50 to 59 and public pension recipient households.
As noted previously, household income is substantially larger among the employees. Multiple spikes
in income are observed among employees which coincide with regularly scheduled bonuses paid by
Japanese ¯rms that are typically distributed twice a year in December and in either June or July.
In addition, some government employees receive a spring bonus in March.17
Overall, these ¯gures indicate that the reported monthly public pension income receipt found
in the JFIES is consistent with the government's policy for public pension bene¯t disbursements
both before and after the March 1990 payment frequency change. The ¯gures highlight the stark
di®erences in the seasonal income patterns of public pension bene¯ts before and after the pay
frequency change as well as between public pension recipients and employees. As can be seen in
these ¯gures, a large number of public pension recipient households receive little or no income either
during the three month interval between their quarterly payments before the disbursement date
17Hori and Shimizutani (2009) provide a discussion of the Japanese bonus system and note that these bonus
payments \have become largely institutionalized and are an integral and anticipated component of workers' compen-
sation" (p.4).
11change or during the non-bene¯t payment months following the change. These large, infrequent
but predictable spikes in income provide a strong test of the LCPIH since, according to the theory,
households should smooth consumption between bene¯t payments.
3.3 Consumption in the JFIES
We construct household consumption measures from the data recorded in the JFIES diaries. We
¯rst examine total household consumption which provides a general understanding of monthly
consumption °uctuations although it contains spending on many durable items that are typically
examined separately. As such, the primary consumption category that we use for testing the
sensitivity to income receipt is non-durable consumption. This consumption category is comparable
to the non-durable consumption measure examined in studies of quarterly consumption changes
using the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (Parker (1999), Hsieh (2003), and Stephens (2008)).18
Since we are examining monthly consumption changes as opposed to the quarterly changes,
however, there is some concern that the standard non-durable consumption measure may contain
some durable components at this higher frequency. Therefore, we examine two additional measures.
First, we follow the approach of Lusardi (1996) which is to de¯ne a category of strictly non-durable
consumption which restricts items that can be consumed within a quarter.19 Second, we examine
total food consumption, both at home and away from home. This measure is dominated by food
at home consumption which comprises over ninety percent of average total food consumption in
our sample. Whereas in the United States families may be able to store large quantities of food,
household space is far more constrained in Japan. For example, we ¯nd that on average households
in our sample report purchasing milk nearly ¯ve times per month which suggests that trips to
stores are rather frequent. Thus, we examine total food consumption since it is a non-durable
at monthly frequencies and it provides a useful point of reference since studies in this literature
18Non-durable consumption includes food at home and away from home, nutritional supplements, utilities (electric-
ity, gas, water, and other fuel), communication (e.g., phone bills and postage stamps), domestic non-durables (e.g.,
kitchen items such as plastic wrap and dishwashing detergent), automotive maintenance, toiletries, tobacco, clothing
services, medical goods and services, public transportation, recreational goods and services, personal care services,
domestic utensils, clothing, footwear, reading, and personal e®ects.
19Strictly non-durables include food at home and away from home, nutritional supplements, utilities, communica-
tion, domestic non-durables, automotive maintenance, toiletries, tobacco, clothing services, medical services, public
transportation, recreational services, and personal care services.
12typically examine the food consumption response.
The monthly °uctuations in consumption induced by the varying seasonal income patterns are
shown in Figure 4. This Figure plots the average change in the log of daily non-durable consumption
by calendar month across the di®erent groups used in our analysis.20 The solid lines shown in both
Panels of the Figure correspond to the quarterly paid public pension recipients before the payment
frequency change. The dotted vertical lines represent the months in which quarterly public pension
bene¯ts are distributed. For these quarterly paid public pension recipients, average daily non-
durable consumption increases the fastest in the months of bene¯t receipt. The rate of increase is
lower during the remaining calendar months with the exception of December when consumption
increases sharply during the holiday season.
The two Panels of Figure 4 separately demonstrate our two identi¯cation strategies. The dashed
line in Panel A of Figure 4 is the average change in log daily non-durable consumption for public
pension recipients after the policy change. The monthly consumption changes shown in the Panel
are quite di®erent across the two groups of public pension recipient throughout the calendar year
except for the sharp consumption changes in both January and December. In fact, bi-monthly paid
public pension recipients appear to have a slight consumption response to their check receipt in
the even numbered calendar months. The dashed line in Panel B of Figure 4 shows the average
consumption changes for employee headed households. Most notably, monthly consumption growth
for employees is above that of quarterly paid public pension recipients only in June, July, and
December which are when employee bonuses are paid.21 Overall, Figure 4 suggests that there
are di®erent seasonal consumption patterns across Japanese households with large di®erences in
seasonal income receipt associated with public pension bene¯t receipt.
4 Empirical Methodology
The basis for the empirical tests presented in this paper is the standard LCPIH in which utility
is assumed to be intertemporally separable and households maximize expected discounted utility
20We plot average daily consumption to account for the variation in the number of days across months.
21Hori and Shimizutani (2009) ¯nd a \very small" but statistically signi¯cant response of consumption to bonus
income receipt in Japan.










subject to the standard constraints. In (1), Ct is consumption in period t, U(¢) is the period speci¯c
utility function, zk is a vector of pre-determined characteristics that modify consumption through
the function º(¢), and ¯ is the discount factor.
The Euler Equation corresponding to maximization of (1) is





where Rt+1 is the gross interest rate between periods t and t + 1. As with the prior literature, we
assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function where ¾ is the coe±cient of relative risk




log(¯Rt+1) + ¢logº(zt+1) + ²t+1 (3)
where ²t+1 is the rational expectations error.
Estimation of equation (3) requires specifying both º(¢) and the vector of characteristics that
modify utility, zt+1. By allowing º(zt+1) = exp(zt+1°), we replace ¢logº(zt+1) in equation (3)
with ¢zt+1° where ° is a vector of parameters. The standard approach is to include time-varying
characteristics in zt+1 since ¯xed household characteristics will be di®erenced out of ¢zt+1. Since
our sample uses monthly observations of two person families, however, characteristics such as family
size and the number of children that are typically included in (3) are not changing between months.
Following previous authors, we include both age and age squared in zt+1 which means that age
appears in ¢zt+1.
The use of monthly consumption data raises an additional issue concerning seasonal variation
in preferences over the calendar year. For example, as shown in Figure 4, there is a sharp spike in
consumption among Japanese households during December due to holiday purchases. In order to
14separate such seasonal preferences from the e®ect of public pension receipt, we take an approach
similar to Paxson (1993) in which we allow zt+1 to include a vector of calendar month indicators,
st+1. Consistent with this speci¯cation, the di®erenced term ¢zt+1 in equation (3) contains the
di®erence of the calendar month variables ¢st+1.
We also account for monthly variability in consumption that arises for a number of reasons.
To account for di®erences in the number of days per month, we create average daily consumption
measures by dividing reported consumption each month by the number of days. We also include a
number of indicators, mt+1, which are associated with additional features that vary by month. We
include month in the survey indicators to account for \survey fatigue," that is, a decline in monthly
consumption associated with a household's duration in the survey which has been observed in prior
studies using consumption data collected in diaries (Stephens 2003, 2006). Since consumption
systematically varies by the day of the week, we also include indicators for whether a particular
calendar month has a ¯fth day of the week for all seven days which could a®ect average daily
consumption for the month.22 In addition, we allow average daily consumption to depend upon
the number of holidays within the month.23 Finally, we control for the introduction of the national
consumption tax in April 1989 by including indicators for March 1989 and April 1989 to account
°uctuations in purchases immediately surrounding the implementation of the tax. We include the
vector mt+1 in equation (3) as ¯rst di®erences since these characteristics are changing between
months t and t + 1.
In order to implement our ¯rst identi¯cation strategy, we include a set of indicators in zt+1
that allow the preference for consumption in month t + 1 to depend upon how long it has been
since the household received its public pension bene¯t. For the period when bene¯ts are distributed
quarterly, we include CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 which is a binary indicator for whether or not a check
is received in month t + 1 and MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 which is a binary indicator for whether or
not month t + 1 is the month immediately following the month of check receipt. When checks are
delivered quarterly, the excluded category is the month prior to check receipt. For the period when
22Wilcox (1989) includes similar controls for the number of \trading days" within a month for each day of the week
when using monthly aggregate consumption data.
23Since we also control for calendar month e®ects, the number of holidays coe±cient is identi¯ed by changes in the
number of holidays for a given calendar month during the sample period.
15bene¯ts are distributed bi-monthly, we include the variable CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 is a binary
indicator for whether or not a check is received in month t + 1. Since equation (3) contains the
di®erence of zt+1, we di®erence these check month variables in our empirical speci¯cation.
We test whether consumption responds to the receipt of public pension income by making the
aforementioned substitutions into equation (3) and estimating
¢logCi;t+1 = agei±1 + ¢si;t+1±2 + ¢mi;t+1±3 + yt+1±4
+ ¯1¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 + ¯2¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1
+ °¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 + ²i;t+1 (4)
where the vector of year variables yt+1 is included to account for the gross interest rate, Rt+1,
which assumed to change at an annual frequency.24 The dependent variable is the change in the
log of average daily consumption between months t and t + 1.25
We can use equation (4) to test a number of hypotheses. Testing either null hypothesis ¯1 = 0
or ¯2 = 0 is a test of whether household consumption systematically depends upon the month of
check receipt when checks are delivered quarterly. A test of the null hypothesis that ° = 0 indicates
whether households smooth consumption when checks are delivered every other month. In addition,
we can also directly test whether the magnitude of the consumption response due to check receipt
is the same both before and after the frequency of payment by testing the null hypothesis ¯1 = °.
An alternative empirical speci¯cation is to use the check month indicators directly in equation
(4) rather than the di®erences of the check month indicators that we include. Such a speci¯cation
would ascertain whether consumption growth is di®erent in the months in which checks are received
relative to other months. However, it is di±cult to directly interpret the magnitude of the response
to check receipt using this alternative speci¯cation. For example, suppose that when checks are
delivered on a bi-monthly basis, consumption is three percent higher in check receipt months relative
24Since our sample period runs from March 1986 to February 1994, we de¯ne our year variables, yt+1, on a March
to February basis. For example, the \year" indicator corresponding to 1993 begins with March 1993 and ends with
February 1994.
25Note that with the exception of the year indicators, yt+1, equation (4) is otherwise identical to the equation that
is generated by ¯rst specifying a cross-sectional equation for log Ci;t and then di®erencing the observations.
16to the months when checks are not delivered. The corresponding pattern of consumption growth
is a three percent increase in the month of check receipt and a decrease of the same amount in the
non-receipt months. Thus, the relative di®erence in consumption growth between check receipt and
non-check receipt months would yield an estimate of a six percent or, more generally, twice the level
di®erence in consumption between these months. This di±culty of interpretation only increases for
the check indicators corresponding to when checks are delivered quarterly.26 Therefore, our main
results shown in the paper are based on equation (4) although we also present results using the
alternative speci¯cation described here in Appendix Table 2.
Our second identi¯cation strategy compares public pension recipient households with employee
headed households only using data from the period when public pensions are delivered quarterly.
We proceed by making a similar set of substitutions as those we use to generate equation (4).
There are three important di®erences from the previous empirical speci¯cation. First, we include
fewer year dummies since we only use observations from March 1986 to February 1990. Second,
although we maintain the identifying assumption that seasonal consumption preferences unrelated
to check receipt are the same for both sets of households, we allow for a di®erent intercept term
for the employee households, EMPLOY EEi. Third, corresponding to the shorten time period, we
only include the di®erences of the check receipt indicators for the period before the pay frequency
change, ¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 and ¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1. The resulting equation is
¢logCi;t+1 = agei±1 + ¢si;t+1±2 + ¢mi;t+1±3 + yt+1±4 + ±5EMPLOY EEi
+ ~ ¯1¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 + ~ ¯2¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 + ²i;t+1 (5)
Under the assumption that seasonal consumption preferences are the same for public pension re-
cipient households and employee headed households, testing the null hypotheses ~ ¯1 = 0 and ~ ¯2 = 0
are tests of the implication of the LCPIH that consumption should not respond to check receipt.
26We can use the coe±cients on the di®erences of the check indicators found in (4) to interpret the parameters
of the alternative speci¯cation in which we instead use the check indicators themselves. Let the coe±cients on the





¤. As discussed above, when checks are
delivered bi-monthly the consumption growth in the month of check receipt is equal to twice the di®erence in the level
of consumption between the receipt and non-receipt months. This relationship implies that °
¤ = 2°. When checks
are delivered quarterly, it can be shown that ¯
¤
1 = ¯1 ¡(¡¯2) = ¯1 +¯2 and that ¯
¤
2 = (¯2 ¡¯1)¡(¡¯2) = 2¯2 ¡¯1.
17Testing these hypotheses requires further restrictions on our sample. First, we only use public
pension recipient households that report receiving these bene¯ts. Although we suspect that there
is missing public pension income data in some households where the head is at least 65 years of age,
we want to avoid incorrectly including households that are not eligible for these payments. Second,
we exclude public pension recipient households which report receiving their bene¯ts in months
that do not match the primary government policy for check disbursement both before and after the
payment frequency change. Thus, we only include households from March 1986-February 1990 that
report public pension receipt in February, May, August, or November and do not report receiving
these bene¯ts in other months. Similarly, while we limit the households from March 1990-February
1994 to those that report receiving bene¯ts in any of the six months of bi-monthly disbursement
but do not report any bene¯ts in any of the remaining months. This approach includes those who
receive both the national pension and the employee pension both before and after the change in our
sample. However, as discussed in the previous section, two subsets of households have a di®erent
payment frequency pattern prior to the change: recipients of the Old-age Welfare Pension and
those individuals who only receive national pension bene¯ts (but not employee pension bene¯ts)
and began doing so prior to April 1986. Thus, these two groups are excluded from our analysis due
to this restriction. While we are not overly concerned that these exclusions have an appreciable
impact on our results, we investigate this issue as part of our robustness checks presented below.
Third, we only use recipient households that report receiving public pension bene¯ts in exactly
two months before the change and in exactly three months after the change. We impose this last
restriction since we want to exclude households that begin receiving public pension bene¯ts during
the sample period so that we do not falsely attribute other contemporaneous income changes,
such as retirement, to the impact of public pension receipt. Thus, we are limiting our sample to
households that receive quarterly public pension payments before the payment frequency change
and those that receive bi-monthly payments after the change. We illustrate the robustness of results
to this restriction below.
The sample statistics, after imposing these additional restrictions, are shown in Panel B of
Table 1 under the heading of \Regression Sample." Observable household characteristics among
18bene¯t recipient households are quite comparable before and after the change. Notice that while
the average age of the household head is nearly identical both before and after the payment fre-
quency change in the Full Sample, there is a slight gap between these two ages in the Regression
Sample. This di®erence is most likely due to dropping the aforementioned subsets of households
with di®erent bene¯t disbursement patterns prior to the payment frequency change. However, this
age di®erence is relatively small which suggests that the impact of this restriction is fairly minor.
Moreover, the remaining observable characteristics are very comparable before and after the change
in the Regression Sample. As before, the employee households have higher levels of income and
consumption than the bene¯t recipients.
5 Results
5.1 The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Monthly Household Income
The monthly income °uctuations are estimated for the regression sample in Table 2.27 The ¯rst
two columns in the Table present the results of estimating equation (4) except that the dependent
variable is the monthly change for the income measure listed at the top of each column.28 These
columns use public pension recipient households both before and after the payment frequency
change. Recall that since these speci¯cations include a full set of calendar month indicators and
that public pension bene¯ts are distributed in the same four calendar months across all households
prior to March 1990 and in the same six months across all households after February 1990, the
coe±cients on the check month indicators are identi¯ed by di®erences in the month of bene¯t
receipt before and after the payment frequency change.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the results for public pension income. The estimated coe±cient on
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 re°ects the level di®erence in public pension income of nearly 690,000
yen between the month of check receipt relative to the month prior to check delivery. The estimated
coe±cient on ¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 indicates a rather economically small although statistically
27All of the results we present in the tables below report standard errors that are adjusted for arbitrary forms of
serial correlation within households over time.
28Since both public pension income and total income equal zero in a large number of months, especially before the
payment frequency change, we examine the impact of check receipt on the level of income rather than the log.
19signi¯cant di®erence in the level of public pension income in the month after check receipt relative
to the month prior to check receipt. This pattern is expected given the quarterly pattern of public
pension income distribution during this period as well as the results previously shown in Panel
B of Figure 1. For the period when public pension income is distributed bi-monthly, the results
are consistent with the pattern shown in Panel B of Figure 2 with the estimated coe±cient on
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 indicating an increase in public pension income of roughly 500,000
yen in response to check receipt.29 Nearly identical patterns are found for total household income
in column (2) which re°ects the extent to which income °uctuations among these households are
driven by public pension bene¯ts.
The ¯nal column of Table 2 presents estimates of monthly total income °uctuations for public
pension recipients prior to March 1990 in comparison to those of employees based on equation
(5). As shown in Figure 3, these two sets of households have quite di®erent monthly income
patterns. While the estimated coe±cient on ¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 again indicates that income
is relatively higher for public pension recipients in the month the receive their checks, the negative
coe±cient on ¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 indicates that the income of public pension recipients is
relatively lower in the month following bene¯t receipt. This negative coe±cient is generated by
the bonuses paid to employees in June and December. In order for our maintained identi¯cation
assumption regarding seasonal consumption preferences being constant across households to remain
valid, these bonus income payments must have no contemporaneous e®ect on the consumption of
employee households. As we noted above, Hori and Shimizutani (2009) ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant
but economically very small e®ect of bonus income receipt on consumption.
5.2 The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Household Consumption
The impact of public pension receipt on household consumption is shown in Table 3. The results
presented in the Table are estimates of equation (4) which uses public pension recipients before and
29The magnitude of the estimated e®ects shown in Table 2 are larger than those found in Figures 1 and 2 since
the full sample used to create the Figures while the regression sample used for the Table includes the restriction that
households receive some public pension income.
20after the payment frequency change.30 The Table shows that consumption signi¯cantly increases
in the month of check receipt prior to the payment frequency change. The estimated coe±cient on
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 is statistically signi¯cant across all four consumption categories. Total
consumption increases by six percent in the month of check receipt prior to the reform. In terms of
testing the life-cycle model, the remaining consumption categories are more pertinent. Non-durable
consumption increases by four percent in the month of check receipt while strict non-durable and
food consumption both increase by over two percent when checks are received.
Consumption remains signi¯cantly higher in the month after check receipt relative to the month
before check receipt since the coe±cients on ¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 are signi¯cant across all of
the columns. Non-durable consumption is nearly three percent higher while both strict non-durable
and food consumption are more than two percent higher in the month after check receipt. In
addition, for both total and non-durable consumption, the consumption response appears to decline
between the month of check receipt and the month after check receipt since the latter estimated
coe±cients are smaller in magnitude than estimated impact for the month of receipt. Surprisingly,
this pattern is reversed for strict non-durable and food consumption although the point estimates
on both of the check month variables are very similar when checks are delivered quarterly. However,
F-tests for each of the four consumption categories cannot reject the equality of the coe±cients on
the check month indicators before the payment frequency change.31 Overall, these results show
that consumption signi¯cantly responds to check receipt when checks are delivered quarterly.
We use the results shown in Table 3 to perform two additional tests. First, we test whether
consumption responds to bi-monthly check receipt after the payment frequency change. We ¯nd
that consumption does not respond to public pension receipt after this change since the estimated
coe±cient on ¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 is insigni¯cant across all of the consumption categories.
Second, we test whether the response in the month of check receipt is the same when checks are paid
30The full set of results corresponding to the estimates found in Table 3 are presented in Appendix Table 1.
Consistent with our ¯ndings in Figure 4, we ¯nd a pronounced consumption increase in December across all four
consumption categories as well as a subsequent decrease in January. There is evidence of a change in consumption
in the months surrounding the implementation of the consumption tax in April 1989 as well as evidence of survey
fatigue. Nearly all of the indicators for the calendar year, for having a ¯fth day of the week, and for the number of
holidays are insigni¯cant.
31These F-test results are not shown here but are available from the authors upon request.
21quarterly and when they are paid bi-monthly. Examining the estimated coe±cients on ¢CHECK
MONTHPRE
i;t+1 and ¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 shows that the estimated impact of check receipt
on consumption decreases by at least 75 percent after the change across each consumption category.
In addition, the F-statistics shown in the ¯nal row of Table 3 con¯rm that these parameters are
statistically di®erent across all four consumption categories. Thus, these ¯ndings suggest that the
payment frequency change led to an improvement in household consumption smoothing behavior.
An important caveat to this last ¯nding is that, as we mentioned above, bene¯t checks are
received during the middle of the month of bene¯t receipt both before and after the change (al-
though, as noted above, the date changes slightly at the time of the reform). Although the days in
the latter half of a check receipt month are immediately after checks have been delivered, the days
in the ¯rst half of these same months represent the longest that households will have gone without
receiving income. Since the e®ects we estimate in the month of check receipt are an average of
the response immediately following check arrival and the end of the interval between check receipt,
the true magnitude of the response to check receipt is likely attenuated by our use of monthly
consumption data.
A useful summary statistic which illustrates this point is derived by ¯rst computing the number
of days since check arrival for each day in each month and then computing the averages of these
measures for each month in the bene¯t receipt cycle. When checks are delivered quarterly, the
average days since receiving check during our sample period are 37 in the month of check receipt,
35 in the month after check receipt, and 66 in the month before check receipt. Interestingly, even
though the month of check receipt has a slightly larger average days since check receipt than the
month after check receipt, there is a larger consumption increase in the month of check receipt.
These calculations suggest that the consumption response to check receipt is non-linear in days
since check receipt. When checks are received every other month, the average number of days since
check receipt is 30 in the month of check receipt and 32 in the other months. This similarity in the
average days since check receipt across months suggests that there may be too little variation in
time since check receipt across months when checks are delivered bi-monthly in order to provide a
powerful test of the life-cycle hypothesis. Therefore, we focus most of our remaining discussion on
22tests that only involve the quarterly payment of public pension bene¯ts.
Table 4 presents the results of implementing our second identi¯cation strategy in which we
estimate equation (5) using both public pension recipient and employee households prior to the
policy change. The estimated e®ect on consumption in the month of check receipt is substantially
larger than that found in Table 3 across all four consumption categories. We ¯nd that the impact
of check receipt on total and non-durable consumption is nearly twelve percent and eight percent,
respectively. The estimated e®ects on strictly non-durable and food consumption are each roughly
four percent. We also ¯nd that the estimated e®ects on consumption in the month after check
receipt are virtually identical using this identi¯cation strategy relative to what we ¯nd in Table
3. These latter results are particularly striking given that in Table 2 we ¯nd that the employee
households experience sharp income spikes due to the receipt of bonus income in these months.
Overall, the results of this second identi¯cation strategy provide strong support for our results
from the ¯rst identi¯cation strategy which uses households from multiple time periods.
The advantage of the empirical speci¯cations we estimate in equations (4) and (5) is that we can
directly interpret the estimated coe±cients on the di®erenced check receipt variables as di®erences
in the levels of consumption between months. In Appendix Table 2, we present the results of
estimating these two speci¯cations using the non-di®erenced check month variables indicators which
yield estimates of the impact of check receipt on consumption growth. In Panel A of the Table
which presents estimates of an equation that is analogous to (4) using public pension recipients
before and after the policy change, we see that consumption growth is statistically signi¯cant in
the month of check receipt when checks are delivered quarterly but is insigni¯cant when checks are
delivered every other month. For the equation analogous to (5) which uses recipient and employee
households before the policy change, the results in Panel B also show that consumption growth is
statistically signi¯cant in the month of check receipt when bene¯ts are paid quarterly. Furthermore,
a comparison of the results in Appendix Table 2 with those in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrates that the
relationships we previously derived in footnote 26 between the parameters of the equations using the
di®erenced check receipt variables and the level check receipt variables hold exactly. Therefore, we
present results using equations (4) and (5) throughout due to the ease of interpreting the estimated
23parameters on the check receipt variables.
We impose a number of exclusion criteria to generate the regression samples in order to limit
the sample to recipient households that are dependent primarily on public pension bene¯ts for their
income as well as to minimize any contemporaneous °uctuations in income due to household labor
market outcomes. We next show the robustness of the results to eliminating a number of these
restrictions. First, we lift the restriction that only nuclear families appear in the sample which,
due to the additional family members, increases the potential sources of household income. This
sample change could increase the possibility of spurious consumption responses associated with
other income sources such as December employment bonuses although any consumption spike due
to such periodic income should be captured by the calendar month e®ects. Second, we relax the
restriction that household heads in the recipient sample cannot work which may potentially could
induce spurious results if labor market entry or exit is correlated with the check distribution months.
Similarly, we allow household heads in the employee sample to leave the labor force although we
require them to be employed in at least one of their sample months. Third, we only require recipient
households to report receiving public pension bene¯ts in one month during their six month panel
period rather than in all possible check distribution months.32 Although these households may
simply underreport public pension bene¯t receipt, they may include new bene¯ciaries that have
recently left the labor force and concurrently experience a large change in income.
Table 5 presents the results of estimating equations (4) and (5) after relaxing all three of the
assumptions mentioned above. For our comparison using recipient households before and after the
change shown in Panel A, the resulting sample is nearly 70 percent larger. The sample increases by
roughly 250 percent when comparing the recipient and employee households (Panel B) primarily
due to the lifting of the household size restriction on the employee sample. Our estimates remain
very similar in magnitude to those found in Tables 3 and 4 although the estimates are much more
precisely estimated due to the larger sample. Overall, the set of results in Table 5 indicates that
our ¯ndings are generally robust to a number of sample selection criteria.
As we discussed earlier, two subsets of households had di®erent disbursement patterns prior to
32However, we still require that all reported checks are received only in the months that match the check disburse-
ment policy.
24the payment frequency change which led them to be excluded from our analysis. The ¯rst group
consists of Old-age Welfare Pension recipients who are at least age 70 and failed to meet the full
contribution requirement for public pension receipt. The second group is comprised of individuals
who only receive national pension bene¯ts and began doing so prior to April 1986. Notice that
households under age 70 are not members of the ¯rst group and therefore are not a®ected by this
exclusion. Moreover, more recent, relatively younger retirees are not subject to the second exclusion
even prior to the reform. As such, separately examining the results for households under age 70
provides a test which, to a large extent, circumvents concerns about excluding households with
di®erent payment frequencies prior to the payment frequency change.
The results from splitting the sample by those under age 70 and those age 70 and above are
shown in Table 6. For both sets of households, the patterns we ¯nd are comparable to those
shown in Table 3. For the younger households, the estimated responses, especially before the
change, are somewhat larger than for the full sample. The response to check receipt after the
change, however, remains insigni¯cant. For the older households, the response to check receipt
is statistically signi¯cant for total and non-durable consumption prior to the change while the
responses for strict non-durable and food consumption are positive but insigni¯cant. Overall, the
¯ndings in Table 6 for households under age 70 indicate that the exclusion of households with
di®erent payment frequencies prior to the change does not a®ect our results.
6 Explanations Based on Variants of the LCPIH
While the basic LCPIH model predicts that consumption does not react to predictable income
°uctuations, variants of the LCPIH predict that consumption changes occur contemporaneously
with income °uctuations. Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991) show that liquidity constraints cause
consumption to respond to predictable income changes since households that desire to borrow from
future income to raise current consumption are unable to do so. Numerous studies have found ev-
idence that consumption tracks income for constrained households but does not for unconstrained
households (e.g., Zeldes 1989; Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles 1998). Models that allow for precau-
25tionary savings, or saving for a rainy day, also generate consumption growth that is faster than
predicted by the basic LCPIH. Carroll (1997) shows that among bu®er stock consumers, those with
higher predictable permanent income growth also have higher levels of consumption growth.
For elderly Japanese households receiving public pension income, these standard explanations
for rejecting the basic LCPIH are less plausible. Among these households, real income growth is
zero since bene¯ts are only adjusted for changes in the price level. While income °uctuates between
zero and the bene¯t amount from month to month, households are not constrained from borrowing
from higher future income. Rather, households can save income from the month in which bene¯ts
are paid to spend during an intervening month. As such, liquidity constraints should not a®ect
households in our sample.
Precautionary savings motives should have little impact on the consumption decisions of these
households. Gourinchas and Parker (2002), when calibrating the parameters of a life-cycle model
using data from the U.S., ¯nd that households transition from saving for precautionary reasons to
life-cycle (i.e., retirement) reasons in their early 40s. In addition, as we have shown above, the vast
majority of the households in our sample essentially face no income uncertainty since they receive
nearly all of their income from public pension bene¯ts. Moreover, universal health care coverage
with income-tested ceilings on monthly co-payments greatly reduces the need of Japanese retirees
to save for uncertain medical expenses. Therefore, we would not expect these precautionary savings
motives to explain the consumption °uctuations due to public pension receipt.
These variants of the LCPIH also have implications for accumulated household assets. During
the sample period, JFIES households that began their six month survey period during August,
September, or October participated in the Family Saving Survey (FSS) which collects wealth infor-
mation.33 For these households, we can compute total net ¯nancial assets which include the value
of the household's holdings in demand and time deposits, stocks and shares, bonds, insurance, and
trust funds minus their credit card debt and housing debt.34 However, outside of demand deposits,
the remaining asset categories are illiquid to some degree and, thus, are not easily available to
33The JFIES began collecting wealth information for all sample households in 2001.
34The FSS does not include the value of real assets such as real estate and vehicles. Very few households in the
sample hold housing debt so including this value has little e®ect on results shown here.
26smooth consumption °uctuations between bene¯t public pension payments.35
Figure 5 presents the distribution of ¯nancial assets to annual income ratios by age for both
total net ¯nancial assets (Panel A) and demand deposits (Panel B).36 For recipient households,
Panel A of the Figure indicates that the median household has four times its annual income in
total net ¯nancial assets while households at the 25th percentile hold twice their annual income in
net ¯nancial assets. Even recipient households at the 10th percentile have nearly a year's worth
of income of total net ¯nancial assets. Demand deposits, the most liquid form of assets that can
be used to smooth consumption, only comprise roughly 12 percent of total gross ¯nancial assets.37
As shown in Panel B of the Figure, however, the median recipient household has a demand deposit
to annual income ratio the ranges from 0.2 to 0.3 which amounts to roughly three months of
income that is readily accessible. Combined with the fact that seven percent and four percent of
gross ¯nancial assets are held in stocks and bonds, respectively, the results in Figure 5 show that
households in this sample are not liquidity constrained. Moreover, an explanation of our ¯ndings
based on a high rate of time preference is not plausible given the high levels of asset holdings among
these households.
The wealth data also shed light on two additional issues. First, as shown in Panel A of Table
1, average total net ¯nancial assets and normal deposits are very close for recipient households
both before and after the payment frequency change. These similarities reduce concerns that lower
wealth among recipient households after the onset of Japan's \Lost Decade" are confounding our
estimates. Second, as shown in both Table 1 and Figure 5, wealth levels are actually lower among
employee households even though current income and consumption are higher among employee
households.38 If the larger responses for recipient households that we estimate when using our
35Time deposits are comparable to certi¯cates of deposit in the U.S. which, prior to maturity, can only be accessed
by incurring a penalty. Life insurance is a used as a savings vehicle by many Japanese households and trust funds
include assets held at trust banks. The vast majority of household ¯nancial wealth in Japan is held in time deposits
and insurance. See Iwaisako (2003) for a more in-depth discussion of the types and distribution of assets held by
Japanese households.
36The annual income measure used to create this ratio is from a retrospective question about household income in
the twelve months preceding the household's ¯rst JFIES monthly interview.
37Since some households hold zero or negative net ¯nancial assets, we calculate average shares out of gross ¯nancial
assets.
38The large wealth di®erences between recipient and employee households are primarily due to the very substantial
lump sum bene¯ts distributed at retirement in Japan.
27second identi¯cation strategy were driven by liquidity constraints, we would expect to ¯nd lower
wealth among recipients which is the opposite of what we observe in the data.
We further examine the liquidity constraint explanation by, following the previous literature,
splitting the sample based on the likelihood of being liquidity constrained. Since only one-quarter
of the sample can be linked to the FSS wealth data, results using sample splits based on wealth yield
imprecise estimates. However, we can split the sample based on the annual income measure used
to generate Figure 5. Since this variable measures annual income during the year preceding the
¯rst monthly interview, it can be used to split the sample because it is pre-determined information
in the context the household's consumption decisions during the survey period.
We categorize recipient households by whether their lagged annual income is below or above
the sample median income for their survey year. Table 7 presents the results from estimating
equation (4) where we include a di®erent set of the three check receipt timing indicators for each of
these two income groups. For both below and above median income households, we ¯nd the exact
same patterns: consumption is sensitive to the receipt of public pension income when bene¯ts are
delivered quarterly but it is not after the change in payment frequency. Similar patterns appear
for both strictly non-durable and food consumption for both sets of households, as well being
similar to the pooled results shown in Table 3. The results in Table 7 generally show that the
consumption increase declines more gradually over the quarterly intervals before the change for the
above median households while the decline occurs in the last month before check receipt for lower
income households. Although these patterns di®er somewhat across the two income groups, both
sets of responses to check receipt before the pay frequency change are inconsistent with the basic
life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the timing of Japanese public pension bene¯ts
and the timing of the bene¯ciaries' consumption. Since public pension bene¯ts comprise the vast
majority of income for retired Japanese households, this bene¯t distribution pattern leads to very
28large income spikes during months when checks are received as well as zero income during months
between the receipt of these checks. As such, examining the timing of consumption in response to
this anticipated seasonal income variation provides a strong test of the LCPIH. We ¯nd that when
public pensions are paid quarterly prior to March 1990, household consumption responds to the
receipt of these bene¯ts. Both identi¯cation strategies we implement lead us to reject LCPIH as
do our various robustness checks. Based on both household asset data and the similarity of the
results between low and high income households, standard variants of the LCPIH such as liquidity
constraints and precautionary savings cannot explain these results.
Our ¯nding of a consumption response to quarterly public pension bene¯ts contrasts with
the prior literature which ¯nds no e®ect of seasonal income variation on household consumption
(Browning and Collado 2001; Hsieh 2003; Paxson 1993). One possible explanation for the di®erence
between our ¯ndings and the earlier studies is that the magnitude of the income °uctuations is much
greater in the current setting relative to the previous literature. For example, the Spanish bonus
workers examined by Browning and Collado (2001) receive paychecks in June and December that
are twice as large as their usual monthly amounts and equal one-seventh of annual earned income.
The quarterly Japanese public pension payments account for one-fourth of total annual income for
a vast majority of these households. In addition, while the Spanish bonus households still receive
a monthly paycheck in the remaining calendar months, Japanese public pension recipients must go
three months between bene¯t payments.
Our results point to interesting avenues for future research. Based on studies of low income
households in which consumption increases upon bene¯t receipt and then signi¯cantly declines until
the next payment is received, prior researchers have suggested that more frequent bene¯t payments
may reduce these consumption °uctuations (Ohls et al. 1992; Wilde and Ranney 2000; Shapiro
2005; Dobkin and Puller, 2007; Mastrobuoni and Weinberg, 2009). Whether such a change can
improve household welfare remains an open question. Although our results are consistent with this
prediction, we are reluctant to ascribe a causal interpretation to this particular ¯nding since the
mid-month distribution of public pension bene¯ts confounds a de¯nitive test using our data. In
addition, as the quote from the Japanese newspaper shown in footnote 2 stresses, a high degree of
29planning is asked of households when income is received quarterly. Recent studies have attributed
an important role for planning in explaining household di®erences in wealth accumulation for re-
tirement (Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). Assessing the importance
of household planning di®erences either as an explanation for short-run consumption °uctuations
or as a link between short-run °uctuations and long-run retirement wealth accumulation, if a link
even exists, can help us to better understand the role of planning in life-cycle savings decisions.
Bibliography
Aguiar, Mark, and Erik Hurst (2005) \Consumption vs. Expenditure," Journal of Political
Economy, 133(5):919-48.
Ameriks, John, Andrew Caplin, and John Leahy (2003) \Wealth Accumulation And The Propen-
sity To Plan," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3): 1007-1047.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Jonathan Skinner, and Steven Weinberg. (2001) \What Accounts for the
Variation in Retirement Wealth Among U.S. Households?" American Economic Review, 91(4):832-
57.
Browning, Martin and M. Dolores Collado (2001) \The Response of Expenditures to Anticipated
Changes: Panel Data Estimates," American Economic Review, 91(3):681-92.
Browning, Martin and Thomas F. Crossley (2001) \The Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and
Saving," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3):3-22.
Browning, Martin and Annamaria Lusardi (1996) \Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro
Facts," Journal of Economic Literature, 34(4):1797-1855.
Casey, Bernard H. (2004) \Reforming the Japanese Retirement Income System: A Special
Case?" Boston College Center for Retirement Research GIB #4.
Carroll, Christopher D. (1997) \Bu®er-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income
Hypothesis," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1):1-56.
30Cochrane, John H. (1989) \The Sensitivity of Tests of the Intertemporal Allocation of Con-
sumption to Near-Rational Alternatives," American Economic Review, 79(3):319-37.
Deaton, Angus (1991) \Saving and Liquidity Constraints," Econometrica, 59(5):1221-48.
Dobkin, Carlos and Steven L. Puller (2007) \The E®ects of Government Transfers on Monthly
Cycles in Drug Abuse, Hospitalization and Mortality," Journal of Public Economics. 91(11-12):
2137-51.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Jonathan A. Parker (2002) \Consumption Over the Life Cycle,"
Econometrica, 70(1):47-89.
Haider, Steven J. and Melvin Stephens Jr. (2007) \Is There a Retirement-Consumption Puzzle?
Evidence Using Subject Retirement Expectations," Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2):247-
264.
Hori, Masahiro and Satoshi Shimizutani (2009) \The Response of Household Expenditure to
Anticipated Income Changes: Bonus Payments and the Seasonality of Consumption in Japan,"
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, vol.9, Issue.1 (Contributions).
Hsieh, Chang-Tai (2003) \Do Consumers React to Anticipated Income Shocks? Evidence from
the Alaska Permanent Fund," American Economic Review, 93(1):397-405.
Iwaisako, Tokuo (2003) \Household Portfolios in Japan," National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 9647.
Jappelli, Tullio, Jorn-Ste®en Pischke, and Nicholas S. Souleles (1998) \Testing for Liquidity
Constraints in Euler Equations With Complementary Data Sources," Review of Economics and
Statistics, 90(1):251-62.
Jappelli, Tullio and Luigi Pistaferri (2010) \The Consumption Response to Income Changes,"
Annual Review of Economics, 2, 479-506.
31Johnson, David S., Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. Souleles (2006) \Household Expenditure
and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001," American Economic Review, 96(5):1589-1610.
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia S. Mitchell (2007) \Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Role
of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth," Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(1):205-
224.
Mastrobuoni, Giovanni and Matthew Weinberg (2009) \Heterogeneity in Intra-Monthly Con-
sumption Patterns, Self-Control, and Savings at Retirement," American Economic Journal: Eco-
nomic Policy. 1(2):163-89.
Ohls, James C., Thomas M. Fraker, Alberto P. Martini, and Michael Ponza (1992) The E®ects
of Cash-Out on Food Stamp Program Participants in San Diego. Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Parker, Jonathan A. (1999) \The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes
in Social Security Taxes," American Economic Review, 89(4):959-73.
Paxson, Christina H. (1993) \Consumption and Income Seasonality in Thailand," Journal of
Political Economy, 101(1):9-72.
Shea, John (1995) \Union Contracts and the Life-Cycle/Permanent-Income Hypothesis," Amer-
ican Economic Review, 85(1):186-200.
Souleles, Nicholas S. (1999) \The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds,"
American Economic Review, 89(4):947-58.
Shapiro, Jesse M. (2005) \Is there a daily discount rate? Evidence from the food stamp nutrition
cycle," Journal of Public Economics, 89(2-3):303-25.
Shapiro, Matthew D. and Joel Slemrod (1995) \Consumer Response to the Timing of Income:
Evidence from a Change in Tax Withholding," American Economic Review 85(1):274-83.
Stephens Jr., Melvin (2003) \`3rd of tha Month': Do Social Security Recipients Smooth Con-
32sumption Between Checks?" American Economic Review, 93(1):406-22.
Stephens Jr., Melvin (2006) \Paycheque Receipt and the Timing of Consumption," The Eco-
nomic Journal, 116(513):680-701.
Stephens Jr., Melvin (2008) \The Consumption Response to Predictable Changes in Discre-
tionary Income: Evidence from the Repayment of Vehicle Loans," Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 90(2):241-52.
Wilcox, David W. (1989) \Social Security Bene¯ts, Consumption Expenditure, and the Life
Cycle Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, 97(2):288-304.
Wilde, Parke E. and Christine K. Ranney (2000) \The Monthly Food Stamp Cycle: Shop-
ping Frequency and Food Intake Decisions in an Endogenous Switching Regression Framework,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(1):200-13.
Zeldes, Stephen P. (1989) \Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investiga-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 3: The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Consumptiona
Public Pension Recipients Before and After Change
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.022** 0.022**
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.035** 0.029** 0.027** 0.029***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.016 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
F-test (p-value) for equality of
coe±cients on month of receipt 5.29** 7.9*** 2.97* 3.85**
e®ects before and after change (0.021) (0.005) (0.085) (0.05)
aThis Table reports estimates based on equation (4). The dependent variable is the change between months t
and t + 1 in the log of the average daily consumption measure shown at the top of each column. Standard errors
robust to arbitrary forms of serial correlation within households are reported in parentheses. All columns report OLS
regressions which include, in addition to the variables shown in the Table, year indicators, age, and ¯rst di®erences
of the following variables: indicators for the calendar month, indicators corresponding to each month in the six
month survey period, indicators for having a ¯fth day in the month for each day of the week, the number of monthly




¤¤¤ represent signi¯cance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4: The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Consumptiona
Public Pension Recipients vs. Employees: Before Change Only
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.115*** 0.075*** 0.042*** 0.036***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.031** 0.023** 0.025** 0.029***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
aThis Table reports estimates based on equation (5). The dependent variable is the change between months t
and t + 1 in the log of the average daily consumption measure shown at the top of each column. Standard errors
robust to arbitrary forms of serial correlation within households are reported in parentheses. All columns report OLS
regressions which include, in addition to the variables shown in the Table, year indicators, age, an age 50-59 group
indicator, and ¯rst di®erences of the following variables: indicators for the calendar month, indicators corresponding
to each month in the six month survey period, indicators for having a ¯fth day in the month for each day of the week,




¤¤¤ represent signi¯cance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.Table 5: The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Consumption
Robustness Checka
A. Public Pension Recipients Before and After Change
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.054*** 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.028***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.018** 0.007 0.008 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
F-test (p-value) for equality of
coe±cients on month of receipt 6.3** 10.57*** 3.24* 12.37***
e®ects before and after change (0.012) (0.001) (0.072) (<0.001)
B. Public Pension Recipients vs. Employees: Before Change Only
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.114*** 0.073*** 0.047*** 0.044***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.039***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
aThe results in this table relax a number of sample selection criteria as discussed in the text. Panel A uses
20,873 ¯rst-di®erence observations and Panel B uses 42,742 ¯rst-di®erence observations. For more details on the
additional regressors included in Panel A and Panel B, see the notes to Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.Table 6: The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Consumption
Public Pension Recipients Before and After Change
Sample Split By Agea
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Under Age 70
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.071*** 0.050*** 0.034** 0.023*
(0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.038* 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.038***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.022 0.006 0.002 0.006
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Age 70 and Above
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.049*** 0.033** 0.012 0.021*
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.033 0.011 0.009 0.020*
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.013 0.001 -0.003 -0.006
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
aSee notes to Table 3.Table 7: The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Consumption
Public Pension Recipients Before and After Change
Sample Split By Incomea
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Below Median Income
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.058*** 0.037*** 0.023* 0.025**
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.041** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.028**
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.018 0.009 0.002 -0.003
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Above Median Income
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.061*** 0.044*** 0.021 0.019*
(0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.029 0.019 0.015 0.030**
(0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.015 -0.003 -0.004 0.001
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
aSee notes to Table 3.Appendix Table 1: The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Consumption
Public Pension Recipients Before and After Change
Full Speci¯cation
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.022** 0.022**
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.035** 0.029** 0.027** 0.029***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
¢CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.016 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Year 1987 -0.002 0.004 0.008 0.010
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Year 1988 0.006 0.002 0.009 -0.008
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Year 1989 0.007 0.014 0.023*** 0.011
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Year 1990 -0.006 0.003 0.012 0.012
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Year 1991 0.015 0.006 0.011 0.014
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Year 1992 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.007
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Year 1993 0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.012
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Age 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Second Interview Month Indicator -0.005 -0.011* -0.011* -0.015***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Third Interview Month Indicator 0.014* 0.004 0.005 -0.008
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Fourth Interview Month Indicator -0.016** -0.013** -0.010* -0.011**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Fifth Interview Month Indicator -0.020** -0.014** -0.019*** -0.011**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
March 1989 Indicator 0.094** 0.124*** 0.114*** 0.116***
(0.048) (0.039) (0.035) (0.029)
April 1989 Indicator -0.070 -0.072* -0.089** -0.069***
(0.046) (0.040) (0.039) (0.026)
Continued on Next PageAppendix Table 1 (Continued)a
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
January Indicator -0.062*** -0.216*** -0.229*** -0.291***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
February Indicator -0.069 -0.084 -0.030 -0.127**
(0.087) (0.064) (0.062) (0.049)
March Indicator 0.036 -0.032 -0.017 -0.037**
(0.030) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018)
April Indicator -0.001 -0.010 0.021 -0.037
(0.044) (0.034) (0.031) (0.026)
June Indicator -0.056 -0.030 0.008 -0.007
(0.050) (0.040) (0.036) (0.030)
July Indicator 0.004 -0.042 -0.025 0.003
(0.045) (0.037) (0.033) (0.028)
August Indicator 0.031 -0.040 0.008 0.071**
(0.047) (0.038) (0.034) (0.028)
September Indicator -0.057 -0.071*** -0.057** -0.059***
(0.035) (0.026) (0.025) (0.020)
October Indicator 0.006 0.021 0.028 -0.010
(0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020)
November Indicator 0.021 -0.010 -0.008 -0.047**
(0.035) (0.026) (0.025) (0.020)
December Indicator 0.253*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 0.337***
(0.036) (0.029) (0.026) (0.022)
Five Mondays Indicator -0.004 -0.015 -0.007 -0.031*
(0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
Five Tuesdays Indicator 0.019 -0.009 0.002 -0.015
(0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018)
Five Wednesdays Indicator -0.007 -0.014 0.002 -0.012
(0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018)
Five Thursdays Indicator -0.006 -0.018 -0.006 -0.024
(0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018)
Five Fridays Indicator -0.002 -0.015 -0.012 -0.030*
(0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018)
Five Saturdays Indicator 0.005 -0.008 0.005 -0.005
(0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
Five Sundays Indicator -0.019 -0.018 -0.006 -0.021
(0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.019)
Number of Holidays -0.000 0.009 0.018 0.002
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
F-test (p-value) for equality of
coe±cients on month of receipt 5.3** 7.9*** 3.0* 3.9**
e®ects before and after change (0.021) (0.005) (0.085) (0.05)
aSee notes to Table 3.Appendix Table 2: The Impact of Public Pension Receipt on Consumption Growtha
A. Public Pension Recipients Before and After Change
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.095*** 0.070*** 0.049** 0.051***
(0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017)
MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 0.011 0.018 0.032 0.036**
(0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018)
CHECK MONTHPOST
i;t+1 0.033 0.006 -0.002 -0.002
(0.025) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
B. Public Pension Recipients vs. Employees: Before Change Only
Total Nondurable Strictly Food
Consumption Consumption Nondurable Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¢CHECK MONTHPRE
i;t+1 0.146*** 0.098*** 0.068*** 0.065***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016)
¢MONTH AFTERPRE
i;t+1 -0.054** -0.029 0.009 0.023
(0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017)
aThis Table reports estimates based on equation (5). As discussed in the text, this speci¯cation is the same
as in Table 3 except that the three check month indicators are included in the model in place of the ¯rst







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eFigure 3: Monthly Income of Recipients and Employees Before the Change






































Recipients: Public Pension IncomeFigure 4: Monthly Changes in Log Daily Non-Durable Consumption
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Employees Before the ChangeFigure 5: Net Assets to Yearly Income Ratio by Age
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